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Abstract 
Recent years have seen a series of natural disasters place significant social and fiscal strain on 
a number of economies. Determining the appropriate tax response to a natural disaster 
involves multiple complex decisions that often need to be made under time pressure with 
limited information. While natural disasters are predicted to become more frequent and 
costly, there has been little focus on the links between taxation and natural disasters. This 
paper outlines the tax responses to the 2010-2011 Queensland floods and identifies potential 
tax policy lessons as a useful resource for future tax policy makers, both in Australia and 
elsewhere. The initial conclusions drawn in the paper are based on 24 semi-structured 
interviews with Australian tax policy makers (from central, state and regional government, 
professional organisations, policy think tanks, tax practitioners, tax academics and 
representatives from the insurance industry) and a review of policy advice documents, 
Government commentary, and media reports. The paper provides insights into the intent of 
the tax responses and the environment in which they were made. In addition, the paper 
discusses whether the responses followed standard tax policy principles, and whether any 
divergence from these principles was linked to the strength of the country’s tax policy 
framework and process.  
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1. Introduction 
Recent years have seen a series of natural disasters place significant social and fiscal strain on 
a number of economies. One such event was the 2010-2011 Queensland floods
1
 in Australia, 
where for three months through the summer heavy rains resulted in extensive flooding. 
Three-quarters of the state of Queensland was declared a disaster zone (Hurst, 2011), 35 
people were killed, over 200,000 people were affected and damage was estimated at A$3.9 
billion, or 1.1% of GDP (Deloitte, 2013; Smart, 2012). Interviews with tax policy makers 
about the responses to this event (discussed further in section 5) referred to the Australian 
experience of natural disasters noted in the iconic Australian poem ‘My Country’ by 
Dorothea Mackellar, “…[f]or flood and fire and famine she pays us back threefold…”, which 
inspired the title for this paper. 
The global financial crisis of the late 2000’s has been a critical stress test of contemporary 
fiscal policy, challenging countries to re-examine settled doctrines and established practices 
(Schick, 2012). In the same way, determining the appropriate government response to a 
natural disaster, like the Queensland floods, involves multiple complex policy decisions that 
often need to be made under significant time pressure with limited information. One area 
where governments are called to respond is tax policy. However, while much has been 
written about the principles of good tax policy, recent tax policy reform has taken place in a 
period of reasonable stability (Barro & Ursúa, 2012).  
This paper outlines the tax policy responses from the Australian government to the 
Queensland floods. Interviews with policy makers, in conjunction with an analysis of the key 
policy documents, allow a rich picture to be built up of the intent of the policy responses and 
the environment in which they were made, as a useful resource for future tax policy makers, 
both in Australia and elsewhere. Specifically, the paper seeks to answer whether Australia 
followed standard tax policy principles when responding to the Queensland floods and 
whether any divergence from these principles was linked to the strength of the country’s tax 
policy framework and process. In doing so, the paper directly addresses an omission from the 
literature.  
While natural disasters are predicted to become more frequent, more intense and more costly 
in coming years (Freeman, Michael, & Muthukumara, 2003; Laframboise & Loko, 2012), 
there has been little academic focus on the links between tax policy development and 
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responses to natural disasters, including the complex interactions amongst those involved in 
the formation of tax policy. The topic of natural disasters and their impact on tax policy is a 
neglected area, with scarce attention having been paid to natural disasters in the economics 
and political science literature (Cavallo & Noy, 2011; Cohen & Werker, 2008). In particular, 
there is limited discussion on business responses (Runyan, 2006; Webb, Tierney & 
Dahlhamer, 1999) and the literature that does exist is dominated by work undertaken in the 
United States (Dahlhamer & Tierney, 1996; Powell, Allan & Dravitzki, 2010; Runyan, 2006; 
Webb et al., 1999). In relation to the role of taxation, the literature that currently exists 
discusses the impact of natural disasters on government policy generally (for example, see: 
Freeman, Michael & Muthukumara, 2003, The World Bank, 2004, The World Bank, 2010, 
Todd & Todd, 2011, and United Nations, 2007). However, there is a gap in the literature 
considering the impact of natural disasters on tax policy. This paper addresses this gap.  
In analysing the tax responses and identifying potential tax policy lessons, the paper uses an 
economic framework, consistent with the approach taken in contemporary international tax 
reviews (for example, Mirrlees, 2011, Tax Review 2001) and other research on natural 
disasters (for example, Sen, 1981, as cited in Cavallo & Noy, 2011). The initial sections of 
the paper consider what constitutes good tax policy (section 2) and the role of taxation in how 
agents respond to natural disasters, including whether standard principles should apply when 
responding to a natural disaster (Section 3). Section four of the paper discusses the research 
approach and Section 5 outlines the specific tax responses that were made to the Queensland 
floods. Finally, Section 6 of the paper concludes with policy lessons, including the impact of 
the Australian tax policy framework and process on the responses that were made. 
2. Good tax policy  
Before considering the extent to which Australia followed standard tax policy when 
responding to the Queensland floods, it is necessary to understand what this constitutes under 
normal circumstances. This section outlines the principles of good taxation set out in the 
economic literature and recent high profile tax reviews, along with other situational factors 
that must be taken into account in applying these principles, such as political influences, 
practical limitations and policy intent. 
Principles of good taxation 
Connolly and Munro (1999) recognise Musgrave’s 1959 seminal work on public finance as 
identifying a set of generally agreed principles for a ‘good’ tax system. Musgrave’s principles 
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of revenue adequacy, equity, efficiency, ease of administration and compliance, and 
consistency with fiscal policy have been broadly accepted as those defining good tax policy. 
“The theory of public finance: a study in public economy” (Musgrave, 1959) has been cited 
over 5000 times, by authors such as Auerbach and Hassett (1999), Heady (1993), Steinmo 
(2003) and Stern (1984). Recently, a number of high profile tax reviews have also largely 
adopted these same principles, as illustrated in Appendix 1. This demonstrates that 
Musgrave’s principles remain relevant for assessing tax policy. However, in applying these 
one must take account of political influences, practical limitations and policy intent, as 
standard policy principles are insufficient guidance on their own (Bird & Zolt, 2003, 
Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989). 
Political influences 
It is important to consider the policy process, as economic theories seldom take context into 
account (Hansen, 1983) and tax policy reflects political factors (Bird & Zolt, 2003; Mirrlees, 
2011).  Similarly, natural disasters occur in a political space and the literature on disaster 
prevention and response has acknowledged the political dimension of disasters (Cohen & 
Werker, 2008). In respect of a natural disaster, political commitments can influence choices 
over whether to fund or incentivise risk mitigation activities, and impact judgements over the 
tax treatment of immediate relief measures and decisions on how to fund recovery, 
rehabilitation, and reconstruction activities in the post-disaster phase. Where a country has a 
decentralized political tax system there will be specific implications for tax policy (Bird & 
Zolt, 2003; Kay, 1990).  The need to factor in political influences has been addressed by the 
choice of a qualitative research approach. In particular, the use of semi-structured interviews 
with those involved in the development of tax policy advice provides an understanding of the 
social and political context in which the policy changes were made. 
Practical limitations 
Tax design must also take into account practical limitations and administrative capacity 
because economic concepts differ in how easily they may be applied in real life (Kay, 1990). 
Practical considerations include the robustness of the tax system, risk of tax avoidance and 
tax evasion, and the costs of tax compliance and administration. The level of electronic 
capability within a particular jurisdiction is also relevant as this opens up new ways that tax 
authorities can administer tax law, collect tax revenues and interact with the wider 
community (OECD, 1998). The need to take practical settings into account applies generally 
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but is particularly relevant to natural disasters. Settings which might operate well under 
normal conditions might not do so when responding to a natural disaster; e.g., restrictions on 
information sharing between government departments, reliance on face-to-face interactions 
between tax authorities and taxpayers, and strict record-keeping requirements. 
Intent 
Design choices are also influenced by the purpose of a particular tax. In general, taxes can be 
categorised into two types: revenue and corrective taxes, with both types relevant when 
considering tax policy responses to a natural disaster.  
Revenue taxes are necessary to fund preventative activities and restore public finances and 
meet the public cost of natural disasters. Revenue taxes fund government spending by raising 
sufficient funds (Bird & Zolt, 2003; Kay, 1990; Tax Review 2001; Tax Working Group, 
2010). In doing so, a long-term view is advocated. Tax systems should not normally be 
altered on a temporary basis to meet current year shortfalls, as frequent tax changes increase 
administration, compliance and efficiency costs (Bird & Zolt, 2003).  
Corrective taxes may be relevant when considering risk reduction measures that might be 
taken in advance of a natural disaster (such as earthquake strengthening or taking out private 
flood insurance) or as part of economic redevelopment in the post-disaster phase. Corrective 
taxes are designed to pursue social or economic outcomes by promoting or discouraging 
behaviours (Kay, 1990; Tax Review 2001). This makes sense where the level of a particular 
activity is not socially desirable. When this occurs, governments may regulate, legislate, 
introduce direct subsidies or use corrective taxes (Bird & Zolt, 2003).  
Corrective taxation is commonly applied in response to market failures associated with 
externalities or public goods (Kay, 1990). It usually takes the form of tax incentives to 
deliberately distort market signals about the relative attractiveness of activities (Tax Review 
2001). However, there are concerns that the use of tax incentives may derive from 
paternalism (Kay, 1990) leading to over investment in subsidised activities (Bird & Zolt, 
2003; Tax Review 2001), increased administrative and compliance costs, lobbying for further 
incentives and opportunities for tax avoidance (Bird & Zolt, 2003; Tax Review 2001), 
meaning costs may outweigh potential benefits.  
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3. The role of taxation in how agents respond to a natural disaster 
In thinking about the role of taxation in how agents respond to a natural disaster, the literature 
generally identifies different stages in individual and government responses, each with a 
range of activities
2
. Appendix 2 provides a summary of the issues that individuals and 
governments face in each phase, using Todd & Todd’s (2011) three phase model (pre-
disaster, disaster response, and post-disaster recovery). As natural disasters expose the 
cumulative implications of many earlier individual and collective decisions (The World 
Bank, 2010), this summary of issues is helpful for identifying the role of tax policy in a 
disaster response, and analysing whether Australia followed standard tax policy principles 
when responding to the Queensland floods.  
3.1. Pre-disaster preparation  
Disaster reduction and mitigation activities can lessen disruption caused by a natural disaster, 
save lives and protect property. For this reason, a variety of measures should be taken in 
advance. These include: risk identification, risk reduction, and risk transfer measures 
(Laframboise & Loko, 2012; Todd & Todd, 2011), as outlined in Appendix 2. However, a 
general theme in the literature is the lack of disaster preparedness by private firms and 
individuals (Spittal, McClure, Siegert & Walkey, 2008). Governments may be able to reduce 
losses where individuals under-prepare for disasters (Sawada & Shimizutani, 2008). 
However, this requires governments to act in advance, rather than waiting until after a natural 
disaster has occurred (Phaup & Kirschner, 2010; Popp, 2006). In doing so, there may be a 
role for tax policy.  
Specifically, taxation has two distinct roles in the pre-disaster phase. The first is to raise 
revenue to fund future disasters, including mitigation activities. In this case, revenue should 
be raised as efficiently as possible (a tax system which is efficient, with minimal impact on 
economic decisions, and which is easy to administer and comply with). A key question in 
doing so is who should bear the burden of tax revenue. Disaster reserves must be paid for by 
current taxes, which may impact on the amount that individuals and firms invest in disaster 
mitigation. Where governments choose to finance the cost of disasters by borrowing, this will 
need to be repaid from future taxes. If local and state governments are responsible for making 
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preventative infrastructure investment, funding and maintenance decisions (Phaup & 
Kirschner, 2010), the tax system should provide sufficient revenue to fund these activities. 
The second role that taxation might play is to incentivise property owners and others to make 
the desired level of pre-disaster investment. In this case, tax policy deliberately aims to distort 
the investment decision by choosing tax settings that shift investment in the desired direction 
and by the desired amount. Considering the types of pre-disaster preparation, the role of tax 
policy with respect to risk identification by firms and households is likely to be limited. 
Where tax policy choices are likely to have real impact (and may therefore be either 
consistent or inconsistent with standard tax policy principles) is on the risk reduction and risk 
transfer activities that private households and firms take; for example, governments may 
choose to promote insurance coverage at an individual and firm level through the tax system
3
 
(Laframboise & Loko, 2012; United Nations, 2007). 
3.2. The immediate response phase  
Tax policy’s role in the response phase4 is to fund immediate relief. Governments must make 
decisions regarding the tax treatment of emergency support payments and may also allow 
individuals or firms to defer (or disregard) tax payments (Phaup & Kirschner, 2010; Venn, 
2012). Tax policy settings also play a role in charitable relief, for example tax incentives for 
donations and tax exemptions for charitable entities. There are unique challenges arising from 
delivering policies and programmes in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Similar challenges 
are likely to apply to delivery of tax responses, and are discussed below. 
Communication  
When large numbers of people have been displaced from their homes and communication 
facilities have been damaged, one of the first challenges for policy implementation is to let 
people know about the types of assistance (including tax relief) that are available and ensure 
that contact with existing clients is not lost (Venn, 2012). Typically a multi-pronged 
communication strategy is used (Frost, 2013; Venn, 2012). Information on assistance 
programs should be clearly communicated, recognising firms and individuals are dealing with 
many other challenges arising from a natural disaster (Frost, 2013). It is also important that 
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financed from tax revenues. 
4 This phase begins immediately after a disaster strikes and encompasses both immediate relief and medium-
term responses which attempt to begin to re-establish functionality of systems and infrastructure (Todd & Todd, 
2011). 
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there is good communication between agencies (Frost, 2013; Laframboise & Loko, 2012; The 
World Bank, 2010; Todd & Todd, 2011). Agencies should have coordinated arrangements for 
administering funding, application processes and points of contact (Frost, 2013). This means 
flexible administration and modern tax communication systems which help citizens cope with 
a natural disaster, including the ability for tax authorities to share taxpayer information and 
work with other government agencies to assist in responding to a natural disaster.  
Resourcing 
It is important to have an adequate number of service-delivery staff to quickly process a large 
number of requests for assistance, including requests for tax relief. As existing staff or assets 
may have been damaged in the disaster, agencies may need to bring in staff from non-
affected regions and set up temporary offices (Venn, 2012). 
Identification 
The process of establishing identity and eligibility for assistance can be hampered if 
documents have been destroyed or are inaccessible. As most claimants apply in good faith, it 
is important to avoid cutting off assistance for those who genuinely need it but are unable to 
establish their identity or eligibility. Governments have helped people without documents 
access assistance by temporarily suspending usual procedures, using existing government 
databases to cross-check eligibility (such as taxpayer records), replacing government 
documents free-of-charge, relying on personal testimony and allowing claimants extended 
periods to confirm their identity and eligibility (Venn, 2012). However, despite these steps 
there is a risk that people will fraudulently claim assistance. Governments have responded to 
this risk by post-event auditing of claimants, legal prosecution and public naming of those 
caught making fraudulent claims (Venn, 2012). 
3.3. The post-disaster phase 
An assessment of whether the Queensland flood disaster responses follow standard tax policy 
principles needs to take account of the wider fiscal position. Natural disasters can place huge 
cash demands on governments at short notice and policymakers must decide to finance 
emergency-related spending and balance-of-payments shortfalls, or to reduce or divert 
spending to cover immediate needs (Laframboise & Loko, 2012). Despite measurement 
challenges, knowing a disaster’s effects on fiscal sustainability is important for making 
informed decisions.  Even if a country can borrow to fund a disaster response, the debts must 
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later be serviced by future taxpayers (Phaup & Kirschner, 2010; The World Bank, 2010). 
Where governments have unsustainable fiscal positions, increasing borrowing in response to 
a disaster can also increase the pain and necessity for future policy adjustment (Anderson & 
Sheppard, 2009; Auerbach & Gale, 2009). Similarly, seignorage has a number of negative 
consequences (Blanchard, 2009). The alternative (or in combination with the above options) 
is for governments to rely on taxation. 
As a result, following a natural disaster, national and local governments need to establish a 
macroeconomic management scheme to tackle fiscal and current account effects, such as 
lower tax revenues, higher public spending, lower exports and higher imports (The World 
Bank, 2004). In general, the macroeconomic policy response to a major catastrophe will 
involve some combination of reserves drawdown, new financing and macroeconomic 
adjustment (Laframboise & Loko, 2012). The right mix will depend on a range of factors, 
including whether the government had taken steps to self-insure or privately insure, whether 
the impact of the natural disaster is expected to be temporary or permanent, the strength of 
the country’s fiscal position and external balance, the exchange rate and the availability of 
domestic and external financing (Laframboise & Loko, 2012).  
3.4. Fit with standard tax policy principles  
Having understood the role that tax policy might play in a natural disaster, it is possible to 
stand back and consider how that role fits with the standard tax policy principles.  
Revenue adequacy 
Revenue adequacy is important when considering the funding of mitigation activities. Post 
disaster, it is an important consideration for governments contemplating how to finance both 
initial responses and longer-term rebuilding activities. Natural disasters also have a more 
general impact on public finances, which raises questions as to whether, post disaster, the 
revenue yield remains adequate. 
Equity 
The principle of equity needs to be considered as part of assessing tax responses to a natural 
disaster as the poor are especially vulnerable to natural disasters. They are more likely to live 
in areas known to be vulnerable (as they may be priced out of safer areas), with their assets 
more likely to be exposed to catastrophic risk (Freeman et al., 2003). As such, tax policy 
choices over the level of redistribution play a role in how natural disasters affect lower socio-
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economic groups.  Equity also needs to be considered when assessing post-disaster tax 
responses. The way funds are raised to finance initial and longer-term responses will have 
distributional impacts, including whether post disaster, the revenue yield remains adequate to 
provide services to those on lower incomes. 
Efficiency 
Where tax policy is not efficient it may impact on individual or firm decisions on whether to 
move or mitigate risk, thereby increasing the costs of a natural disaster. For example, 
property transaction taxes can reduce property sales and encourage undervaluation (The 
World Bank, 2010) and reducing insurance premiums through tax policy runs the danger of 
perpetuating inadequate adaption to the risk of natural disasters (Freeman et al., 2003). 
Governments also need to raise funds for responding and rebuilding in the most efficient 
manner, thereby minimising (as far as possible) impediments to economic growth.  
Minimising compliance and administration costs 
In the immediate response phase, tax compliance and administration costs need to be 
considered. There are unique challenges arising from delivering policies and programmes in 
the aftermath of a natural disaster, due to the scale and speed of the response required, as well 
as the difficult environment in which these must be delivered (Venn, 2012; Frost, 2013). 
Similar challenges are likely to apply to delivery of tax responses, with a well-operating tax 
system and its administration helping the economic and social recovery of the affected region 
and country (Inland Revenue, 2013). 
Consistency with fiscal policy 
Finally, when thinking about tax responses to a natural disaster, it is important to consider tax 
policy design within the context of broader fiscal policy. Effects of a natural disaster on 
individuals and firms translate into large and long-lasting macro-economic impacts (Freeman 
et al., 2003). Depending on how governments respond, natural disasters can have a negative 
impact on the fiscal accounts and levels of public debt. Typically, fiscal revenues (taxation) 
decrease as economic activity declines. At the same time, emergency relief and 
reconstruction lead to a surge in government expenditures. If governments borrow to fund the 
deficit, public debt ratios rise. Knowing a disaster’s effects on fiscal sustainability is 
important for making informed decisions, as while governments can borrow to fund a disaster 
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response, they must ultimately pay these funds back, either from taxes or spending cuts 
elsewhere (The World Bank, 2010).  
3.5. Differing tax policy in response to a natural disaster 
While it is possible to see how standard tax policy principles play a role in response to natural 
disasters, a key question in assessing whether Australia followed standard tax policy 
principles when responding to the Queensland floods, is whether they should do so? While 
there is limited discussion on natural disasters and taxation, some guidance is provided more 
generally as to whether the standard principles of tax policy apply equally in good and bad 
times. A substantial literature on war financing notes that unusual macroeconomic conditions 
prevail during war (Caplan, 2002). Cappella (2012) concludes that leaders choose between 
alternative means of war finance, including taxation, based on their bureaucratic capacity to 
extract revenue, currency reserves and leaders’ preferences. Grossman and Han (1991) argue 
that a state’s choice of war financing involves weighing the cost of spending in reducing 
consumption against the benefit of avoiding defeat. More recently, public finance literature 
has discussed responses to the global financial crisis. Schick (2012) writes that a financial 
crisis takes more time and resources to resolve than a conventional recession and therefore 
generally requires different policies and remedies. LeBlanc, Mathews and Mellbye (2013) 
note that, following the global financial crisis, tax policy has been shaped by shorter-term 
fiscal and macroeconomic considerations. Based on this literature, there may be a case for tax 
policy responses to natural disasters to depart from standard tax policy principles. 
One way that tax policy may differ when responding to a natural disaster is through a 
different weighting being placed on the standard tax policy principles, as while there is broad 
agreement on the principles, there is less accord about how to make trade-offs between the 
principles. Adam Smith (1776) suggested that nations should endeavour “to render their 
taxes as equal as they could contrive; as certain, as convenient, … and, … as little 
burdensome to the people”. However, the only guidance he gave was to value certainty over 
equity. Musgrave similarly provides limited guidance, only noting that the objectives will not 
always be in agreement, and where they conflict, trade-offs will be required (Musgrave & 
Musgrave, 1989). It was not until Mirrlees developed optimal tax theory in 1971 that a 
framework for the careful analysis of tax policy trade-offs was developed (Kay, 1990). 
However, the Mirrlees framework is complex, relatively few general results emerge, and 
practical conclusions for policy cannot readily be drawn (Creedy, 2011; Kay, 1990).  
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In response to this need for a practical approach to making trade-offs, various international 
tax reviews have addressed the issue. The need to make trade-offs was recognised in the Tax 
Review 2001; however, they argued that the conflict can be overstated (Tax Review 2001). 
Henry et al (2010), henceforth the Henry Review, acknowledged that judgements are required 
and provided a list of broad objectives, though the list is barely more than a restatement of the 
standard policy principles. Most recently, the Mirrlees Review (Mirrlees, 2011) used an 
optimal tax theory approach, applying the guidelines of neutrality, simplicity and stability. 
However, as noted above this approach has been criticised as overly theoretical. Conclusions 
from optimal tax theory for tax policy in practice can be hard to identify, or even if they can 
be identified, they are often difficult to implement. 
The lack of guidance about how to make tax policy trade-offs was addressed to a certain 
extent by the Tax Working Group (2010), who adopted a model of rational policy analysis 
(Creedy, 2010). They noted that choosing between reform options will depend on value 
judgements that are required where competing objectives are involved, and the scale of 
reform that the government is willing to undertake. To help make these value judgements, the 
Tax Working Group (2010) identified various tax reform options. To help make trade-offs, 
each scenario was tested against the standard tax policy principles to identify the costs and 
benefits of various reform choices.  
Another recent example of how trade-offs might be made is the work of Ball and Creedy 
(2013). They use a range of two-period models to highlight some of the important tax policy 
inter-relationships and trade-offs involved when governments are faced with the possibility of 
funding a future contingency. They conclude that the size of the potential future tax-financed 
cost and its associated probability are the major determinants of the optimal tax policy, with 
potential future expenditure needing to be relatively large before ex ante action is taken (Ball 
and Creedy, 2013). However, the models are highly simplified and no consideration is given 
to distributional issues. Barro (2009, as cited in Cavallo & Noy 2011) argues that disasters 
have a much larger welfare cost than economic fluctuations of lesser size, which means 
distributional issues are highly relevant. This paper will analyse what actually happened with 
a real life natural disaster. 
4. Analysing tax policy responses to the Queensland Floods – research design 
This paper discusses the tax responses to the Queensland floods.  It is part of a broader 
qualitative study investigating tax policy changes made in response to recent natural disasters 
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in Australia, New Zealand and Japan and whether the principles of good tax policy still hold 
when a country is faced with a large economic shock.  
A qualitative approach has been adopted because it aids interpretation of tax policy responses 
by allowing a picture to be formed of the features of the environment in which they were 
made, creates awareness of the full range of factors that led to the particular tax policy 
outcomes and caters for the complexity of the situation where it is not possible to hold 
everything else constant while only the tax treatment of a particular area is tested. It is also 
suited to investigating exploratory and descriptive questions which are not covered in the 
existing literature.   
The primary data source for the Australian component of the study was 24 semi-structured 
interviews
5
 with Australian tax policy makers (from central, state and regional government, 
professional organisations, policy think tanks, tax practitioners, tax academics and 
representatives from the insurance industry). Participants were selected on the basis of their 
differing roles in the tax policy development process. They were recruited through a 
professional network of tax contacts and interviewed in their places of work. The aim was to 
try and gain as complete a picture as possible of how tax policy principles were applied in 
responding to the Queensland floods and whether the ability to respond in line with standard 
tax policy principles was linked to the strength of the existing tax policy framework. An 
emergent design (and sampling strategy) approach was applied.   
As well as providing data for analysis, the interviews offered insights into the environment 
and clarified details in written documents. These secondary data sources included: relevant 
policy advice documents, Government commentary, such as material from Treasury and tax 
authority websites, academic and practitioner commentary on the policy changes, and media 
reports.  
This wider study adopts an ‘interpretive-descriptive’ approach (Belenky, 1992, cited in 
Maykut and Morehouse, 1994) to qualitative analysis. This approach is appropriate where the 
research is primarily concerned with accurately describing what was understood and 
reconstructing the data into a ‘recognizable reality’ for the people who have participated in 
the study (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). In this case, the aim is 
to understand more about and describe the tax responses to the Queensland floods, and to 
develop statements of fact from a rigorous and systematic analysis of the data. Specifically, 
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Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) constant comparative method of data analysis has been adopted. 
The methodology also draws on the work of Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Taylor and 
Bogdan (1984), and involves: 
 Discovery – analysis of the data to identify recurring themes and topics as coding 
categories. 
 Preliminary coding – using NVivo software, coding of a selection of sources to 
preliminary categories.   
 Refinement – development of a category rule for each theme and coding of the 
remaining data based on these rules for inclusion. 
 This paper reports on the first two parts of this methodological process. 
A key limitation that arises from qualitative research is the potential for subjectivity in the 
analysis, with subjects selected by the researcher (such as a focus on policy makers as 
opposed to individuals affected by natural disasters) and data interpreted with the particular 
beliefs of the researcher (such as the experience of the researcher as an advisor on the New 
Zealand tax policy changes). However, it is acknowledged that researcher awareness of these 
limitations may assist in reducing their influence on the research output.  In conducting the 
analysis it is important to be aware of prejudices, viewpoints or assumptions regarding the 
phenomenon under investigation which may be influencing what one is trying to understand 
(Katz, 1987). The research design for this study also incorporated a number of procedures for 
data collection and analysis to increase the validity of qualitative research. These included 
multiple methods of data collection, with data gathered from original policy documents in 
combination with interviewing the policy makers involved. Using multiple data sources helps 
address subjectivity within particular sources and improves the external validity of the 
research. Member checks were also conducted, with research participants confirming that 
interview transcripts accurately described their experience.  
5. Tax responses to the Queensland floods 
The following section outlines the tax responses to the Queensland floods using Todd & 
Todd’s (2011) three phase model (pre-disaster, disaster response, and post-disaster recovery).  
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5.1. Pre-disaster phase 
Government funding arrangements 
Australia is exposed to both frequent and large natural disasters. Interview participants 
referred to Australia’s disaster season, noting that “this is even reflected in the Dorothea 
Mackellar poem, ‘My Country’… . We have floods, we have bush fires, and they are an 
annual event.  So it is really quite silly to be having to step up and pay for the odd one of 
these as we go along. They happen all the time” (tax academic).   
Between 2000 and 2012, losses borne by insurers totalled A$16.1b, an average of A$1.2b per 
year (Deloitte, 2013) and the costs are growing as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 – Insurance costs of natural disasters 1970 – 2013 
 
(Productivity Commission, 2014, p.4). 
Despite the risk that natural disasters pose in Australia, there is no formal natural disaster 
scheme
6
. Instead, the primary mechanism through which the Australian Government funds 
                                                             
6 Australia does have a Terrorism Insurance Scheme, established under the Terrorism Insurance Act 2003. This 
minimises wider economic impacts from the withdrawal of terrorism insurance in the wake of the September 11 
attacks. It has been reviewed a number of times, most recently in 2012. However, due to the continued lack of 
commercial terrorism reinsurance on reasonable term, the reviews have recommended that the scheme continue 
in operation. The scheme provides $13.43bn in capacity for insurance claims. This capacity is split into several 
layers. The first A$100m in losses is to be met by the industry. The second layer of cover is provided by 
A$375m from the scheme’s reserved fund. The remaining cover is provided by purchased terrorism reinsurance 
and then an A$10bn Commonwealth guarantee. Insurers pay premiums to the scheme for reinsuring their 
terrorism risk and may pass on the cost to their policyholders. One of the recommendations of the 2012 review 
was for the scheme to pay an initial dividend to the Commonwealth Government of $400 million, to be spread 
over four years (The Australian Treasury, 2012a).  
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disaster relief and recovery activities by state and territory governments is the Natural 
Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA). The NDRAA have over time 
constituted the majority of Australian Government spending on natural disasters. The scale of 
these payments is shown in Figure 2: 
Figure 2 – Australian Government NDRAA payments 1999 – 2016a 
 
(The Australian Treasury, 2012a, p.11). 
 
The arrangements were established in 1974 and are intended to assist state and territory 
governments with the fiscal burden of large scale expenditure on disaster relief and recovery 
payments and infrastructure restoration (The Australian Treasury, 2012a). The NDRRA 
operate by reimbursing states and territories for a portion of their expenditure on eligible 
disaster recovery activities and measures, once particular thresholds have been exceeded: 
 50% of a state’s disaster expenditure on individual and community recovery packages, 
if the state’s first expenditure threshold has not been exceeded; 
 50% of a state’s disaster expenditure on restoration of public assets if the state’s first 
expenditure threshold has been exceeded; and 
 75% of any excess expenditure, above the state’s second threshold. (Attorney-General’s 
Department, 2012). 
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Following the Queensland floods, the Australian Productivity Commission has been asked to 
assess Government funding arrangements for natural disasters, including the NDRAA, with 
their report to be completed by December 2014 (Productivity Commission, 2014).  
Insurance 
One of the issues being considered by the Productivity Commission is the impact of 
Government funding arrangements on the level of private insurance (Productivity 
Commission, 2014). In Australia, private insurance plays a key role in providing coverage for 
natural disasters; For example, private insurance met 77% of the costs of the 1999 Sydney 
hail storm, 66% of funding for Cyclone Larry in 2006 and 43% of the costs of the 2009 
Victorian bush fires (Latham, McCourt, & Larkin, 2010). However, a number of recent 
reviews have criticised the current tax treatment of insurance. Insurance premiums attracted 
State and Territory stamp duty at rates of between 7.5% and 11% (at the time of the 
Queensland floods), a fire service levy on insurers in Victoria, NSW and Tasmania, and GST. 
Driven by increases in insurance premiums, these taxes have been a growing revenue source 
for the States
7
. Compared to other countries, Australian taxes on insurance are relatively high, 
as illustrated in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 – International comparison of insurance taxes (excluding VAT/GST) 
 
(Henry Review, p.472). 
                                                             
7 Revenue from state taxes on insurance increased 112% from A$2b in 1998/99 to $4.3b in 2007/08 (Henry 
Review). 
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The Henry Review recommended that all specific taxes on insurance products should be 
abolished, with insurance products treated like most other services consumed in Australia and 
subject to only one broad-based tax on consumption. Similar recommendations were made by 
the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (2010). They recommended replacing the fire 
services levy with a property based levy, which would result in a substantial reduction in the 
amount that consumers pay for a given level of insurance cover. Assuming stamp duty on 
insurance and GST are retained, the cost of insurance would fall by 45% for a country 
business, by 34% for a metropolitan business, by 24% for a country house, and by 17% for a 
metropolitan house. Finally, the National Disaster Insurance Review (National Disaster 
Insurance Review Panel, 2011) also considered this issue. Submissions from insurers (and a 
number of individuals) argued for the removal of State taxes on insurance as an efficient 
method for governments to improve the affordability of insurance. The Review noted that the 
purchase of insurance by consumers represents a conscious attempt by them to take 
responsibility for the management of the risks that they bear, which should be encouraged. 
However, while the Review Panel endorsed the recommendations of the Henry Review and 
others, they acknowledged that these taxes are a significant source of revenue for State and 
Territory governments, and any consideration of their removal would need to be made in the 
context of broader State level fiscal reform efforts.  
The rationale for the proposed changes was concerns over efficiency, equity, and compliance 
and administration costs. The Henry Review citing a number of reports (IPART, 2008; The 
Centre for International Economics, 2009; Freebairn, 2009), observed that insurance taxes 
can impose significant costs and are one of the least efficient taxes available to states. 
Insurance taxes mean that people pay more to achieve the same level of risk reduction which 
can reduce the level of cover they purchase or deter them from insuring at all. This reduces 
the size of the insurance market and therefore the ability to pool risk, further increasing 
premiums. While States with higher taxes do not always have higher rates of non-insurance 
and under-insurance, the Henry Review cited studies which found a correlation between taxes 
on insurance and the level of non-insurance (Tooth & Barker, 2007; and Tooth 2007). By 
encouraging under-insurance and non-insurance, insurance taxes may lead to an increase in 
government expenditure in the event of a disaster.  
The various reviews were also concerned about inequity and lack of transparency with the 
current arrangements, as rates of non-insurance generally decline with higher incomes, and 
non-insurance can also be higher for certain demographic groups, such as retirees and single 
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parents, who because of their financial positions may be more vulnerable in the case of loss 
(Tooth & Barker, 2007). In respect of fire services, those with a higher fire risk have higher 
insurance premiums and therefore pay a high fire services levy, which is equitable. However, 
those with higher risks not related to fire services, contribute more. The uninsured do not 
generally contribute and no fire services levy is collected on motor vehicle insurance, despite 
motor vehicle owners receiving around 15% of the benefits of the service (2009 Victorian 
Bushfires Royal Commission, 2009). While there are some cost-recovery mechanisms, these 
tend to be applied only to businesses, meaning the insured bare a higher burden for funding 
services.  The Henry Review noted that one option for increasing equity might be to 
consistently apply cost recovery. However, due to the public good nature of fire services, it 
could create a risk that the uninsured do not call the fire service, increasing the risk of 
damage to other properties.  
Finally, in relation to compliance and administration costs, the Henry Review noted that one 
of the attractions of such taxes is their ease of administration. However, the fire services levy 
requires insurers to forecast the market when applying the tax, as this is required to be paid in 
advance. 
In response to these concerns, action has being taken by State governments to reduce the 
impost on insurers. The Victorian Government announced that it will replace the Fire 
Services Levy with a property based payment and abolition of the levy was also an election 
commitment of the NSW Government (National Disaster Insurance Review Panel, 2011). 
This will significantly reduce the cost of insurance policies in these States. 
The final report of the Natural Disaster Insurance Review also included a recommendation 
for the Commonwealth Government to create a system of premium discounts so that 
purchasers of home insurance, home contents and home unit insurance policies in areas 
subject to flood risk be eligible for discounts against the full cost of flood insurance (National 
Disaster Insurance Review Panel, 2011). The discount facility would be funded by claim 
subsidies from the Commonwealth Government under a Commonwealth Government 
guarantee, and supplemented by contributions from the State in which the event causing the 
funding shortfall occurs. However, concerns were raised about the cost of these proposals for 
the taxpayer and no such scheme has been established: “…the report entrenches the taxpayer 
as the insurer of last resort. The Review Panel legitimises and encourages moral hazard by 
recommending discounted premiums and rejecting home and contents insurance be 
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compulsory. That is, the cost of those uninsured and underinsured will continually be met by 
taxpayers while discounted premiums will be underwritten by taxpayers” (Mahon & Mahon, 
2012, p.1). 
Taxation 
In investigating the tax responses to the Queensland floods, it is necessary to consider the 
pre-existing rules for dealing with natural disasters that had developed within the tax policy 
framework and policy processes in place prior to the Queensland floods. In addition to the 
taxation of insurance, Australian tax legislation includes a number of measures targeted at 
natural disasters. References to natural disasters in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 and 
Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1986 include: 
 Sections 30-45A, 30-46 – Deductions for gifts to disaster relief funds. 
 Section 35-55 – Deferral of deductions for non-commercial operations. The 
Commissioner has discretion not to apply this rule where business activities have been 
affected as the result of a natural disaster.  
 Sections 124-85 and 124-95 – Capital gains roll-over relief. New asset treated as pre-
CGT asset if the original asset was lost or destroyed as a result of a natural disaster. 
 Sections 393-1, 393-15, 393-40 – Farm management deposits. A deposit repaid within 
12 months as a result of a natural disaster is still treated as deductible. 
 Section 995-1 – The definition of “Emergency Management Minister” means the 
Minister who administers the Social Security Act 1991, insofar as it relates to 
Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment. 
 Section 58N – An exempt benefit includes emergency assistance provided by an 
employer to an employee. 
Other special tax rules for natural disasters include: the ability for businesses affected by a 
disaster to vary their pay as you go tax instalments (Farmer, 2011) and discretionary relief 
under the non-commercial loss rules and deemed dividend rules where the taxpayer’s 
business activity has been adversely affect by floods (PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia, 
2011). 
5.2. Immediate response phase 
Immediate tax responses to the Queensland floods have been classified into administrative 
and emergency support measures, and are discussed below. 
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Administrative responses 
The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has centralised business continuity arrangements with 
a fulltime staff of nine people to coordinate any responses and crisis planning. The model 
involves 24-hour capability with ongoing monitoring of risks and has operated for several 
years following a review by the Australian National Audit Office. The ATO integrate 
business continuity arrangements into all planning and response issues for people, buildings, 
systems, services, and communications. Under these arrangements, the ATO made a number 
of administrative responses to the Queensland floods. 
The ATO (2011) provided disaster response information. This included an emergency 
information line, dedicated call centre support for affected people and specific pages on the 
ATO website, including frequently asked questions. There was ATO support for tax agents, 
including a dedicated natural disaster line and a personal contact from an ATO relationship 
manager. The ATO also clarified the tax treatment around common issues such as donations, 
grants and capital gains taxation.  
The Commissioner of Taxation announced extensions of time. The Commissioner has the 
authorisation to make blank automated deferrals for a class of taxpayer. “We identify them 
and automatically place deferrals … on their accounts” (Government tax officials). 
Businesses located within the flood affected area could obtain an extension of time to lodge 
certain tax documents and pay taxes, in many cases without interest and penalties (ATO, 
2011; Farmer, 2011). The State authorities in New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria 
also announced temporary relief from the payment of state taxes and the lodgement of returns 
for businesses affected by the floods (Farmer, 2011). 
Finally, the ATO outlined practical approaches to dealing with record reconstruction, 
including use of reasonable estimates for lost records and assistance visits where ATO 
officers would assist in the reconstruction process (ATO, 2011; Farmer, 2011).   
In implementing administrative responses, the ATO links in with the wider Australian 
government response. The tax office worked as part of a coordinated response with other 
government agencies and industry groups like the Australian Chamber of Commerce and the 
Council of Small Business of Australia. They deployed 550 staff out in the field, running 
small business seminars, and providing staff to help process emergency payment claims 
(ATO, 2011). They mobilised representation from the ATO to sit on a crisis committee 
established by the Attorney General, and later, a recovery committee.  
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The wider government response in Australia includes clear definition of responsibilities. The 
Department of Human Services is the first agency into a disaster affected area after Defence. 
If the disaster event exceeds the capabilities of state-based agencies, they will activate a 
national emergency call centre
8
. If the scale of the incident exceeds Department of Human 
Services’ capability, then the ATO provides additional contact centre resources.  
Similar lodgement and payment extensions were also made by the State Revenue authorities 
(Office of State Revenue, 2011). 
Emergency support 
As well as administrative responses, the Australian Government also made a number of 
emergency support responses. Emergency support measures made in response to the 
Queensland floods were in the nature of income tax exemptions for government assistance 
and tax changes to facilitate charitable funding. 
The Australian Government provided financial assistance to households through: 
 The Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment; 
 The Disaster Income Recovery Subsidy;  
 Assistance through the NDRAA; and 
 Ex gratia payment for New Zealanders affected by flooding. 
The Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment is a non-means tested payment of 
A$1,000 for adults and A$400 for children who are affected by a major disaster (Productivity 
Commission, 2014). Historically, different definitions of ‘adversely affected’ have been 
applied. However, in respect of the Queensland floods, this was defined as a person who, as a 
direct result of the disaster: 
 was seriously injured;  
 had an immediate family member killed;  
 had their principal place of residence destroyed or sustain major damage;  
 was unable to gain access to their principal place of residence for at least 24 hours;  
 was stranded in their principal place of residence for at least 24 hours;  
                                                             
8
 This can be activated by a State or by the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
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 was without electricity, water, gas, sewerage service or another essential service for at 
least 48 hours; or 
 is the principal carer of a child to whom any of the previous situations applied (Social 
Security (Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment) Determination 2011 
(No. 1). 
The payment is administered by Centre Link and as a one-off compensation payment was 
exempted from income tax (Section 52-10, Income Tax Assessment Act 1997).  
The Disaster Income Recovery Subsidy was an income replacement payment
9
. It provides 
income support recovery assistance for individuals who have lost their main source of income 
as a direct result of a natural disaster, including small businesses and farmers. It consisted of 
ex-gratia payments equivalent to the maximum applicable rate of the Newstart Allowance 
(unemployment benefit) or Youth Allowance (benefit for those 16 to 24 who are studying or 
looking for work). It was payable for a maximum period of 13 weeks from the start of the 
flooding in Queensland, or from when the claimant’s loss of income commenced. It is paid in 
addition to the primary Commonwealth payment made to individuals in the wake of disasters, 
the Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment (Social Security Legislation 
Amendment (Disaster Recovery Allowance) Bill 2013). 
Those eligible to receive the payment were working age Australian residents living in 
Australia, or foreign nationals living or working in Australia at the time of the disaster, who 
derived an income from the area affected by the disaster, or resided in the area affected, and 
who did not receive another income support payment or pension. The payment was subject to 
an income test to determine eligibility (Department of Human Services, 2013; Social Security 
Legislation Amendment (Disaster Recovery Allowance) Bill 2013). 
The Disaster Income Recovery Subsidies were not legislated for and have been paid as ex 
gratia payments. The decision to make ex gratia payments is made by the Prime Minister 
and/or Cabinet with the basis of their authority to do so emanating from the government’s 
executive powers under section 61 of the Constitution. The government can call upon the ex 
gratia power to deliver financial relief quickly at short notice. As such, the power to make ex 
gratia payments provides flexibility to government to be able to offer assistance to those in 
                                                             
9 This payment was announced by the Government in the aftermath of the Queensland floods in January and 
February 2009 and the Black Saturday bushfires in Victoria in February 2009 (Social Security Legislation 
Amendment (Disaster Recovery Allowance) Bill 2013). 
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need quickly. However, such payments are not subject to the range of accountability 
measures that apply to payments made under legislation. Another drawback is that access to 
information about the payment is much more limited compared to legislative schemes. The 
rules establishing these schemes are not subject to the same kinds of publication and tabling 
requirements as legislative instruments are and the details of such schemes may not be readily 
available online. As such, in 2013 a decision was made to allow for payments to be made in 
similar circumstances but under a legislative scheme (the Disaster Recovery Allowance) 
(Social Security Legislation Amendment (Disaster Recovery Allowance) Bill 2013). 
Disaster Income Recovery Subsidy payments are generally taxable. However, the Australian 
Government has declared that, for some recent natural disasters, these payments are exempt 
income. You do not pay tax on exempt income but you include the amount when you work 
out your tax loss. The Tax Laws Amendment (2011 Measures No.1) Bill 2011 exempted the 
Disaster Income Recovery Subsidy paid to those affected by the floods in Australia on or 
after 29 November 2010 and by Cyclone Yasi. 
In respect of assistance for individuals, the Australian Government will reimburse 50 per cent 
of State or Territory expenditure on personal hardship and distress assistance under the 
NDRAA. This is generally for emergency aid for clothing, food, accommodation, repairs to 
housing and replacement of essential household items and personal effects (Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2013a). For the Queensland floods, personal hardship and distress assistance 
was available in 25 local government areas. In addition, communities were eligible for 
essential services safety and reconnection grants of up to $5,000 and funeral and memorial 
grants of up to $10,000 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). 
NDRRA payments are generally taxable. However, in respect of the Queensland floods, 
emergency assistance grants were treated as non-taxable (ATO, 2012).  
Following diplomatic pressure, the Australian Government announced special flood relief 
measures for New Zealand non-protected special category visa holders adversely affected by 
the Queensland floods (NZPA, 2011; The Australian Treasury, 2012b). These ex gratia 
payments made available funds equivalent to the Australian Government Disaster Recovery 
Payment to New Zealanders who would otherwise be ineligible for this kind of assistance. In  
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2011/2012, around 202 ‘non protected’ SCV10 holders were granted lump sum payments 
following disasters, worth approximately $232 000 in total (Social Security Legislation 
Amendment (Disaster Recovery Allowance) Bill 2013). The Australian Government 
legislated to exempt these payments from income tax (Tax Laws Amendment (2011 
Measures No.1) Bill 2011).  
The other form of emergency support responses related to charitable relief. The Queensland 
Premier declared the floods to be a disaster, allowing the ATO to follow normal procedures 
with respect to disaster relief
11
.  However, as well as following normal procedures, the 
Australia Government also made a legislative change with respect to the charitable status of 
bodies involved in rebuilding activities following the Queensland floods. Australia recently 
introduced a statutory definition of a charity
12
. Previously they relied on the common law 
definition. Following the experience in Queensland, as part of enshrining the definition in law 
and following the natural disaster insurance review, they extended the common law definition 
to enable charities to rebuild not-for-profit community assets.    
5.3. Post-disaster phase 
Post-disaster tax responses to the Queensland floods have been classified into funding and 
rebuilding measures, and are discussed below. 
Funding 
On 27 January 2011, the Australian government announced that it would impose a flood levy 
(the Temporary Flood and Cyclone Reconstruction Levy) on individual taxpayers for the 
2011/2012 financial year to assist in funding the re-building of flood affected areas and 
infrastructure (Farmer, 2011). The levy was set at 0.5% on income from A$50,001 to 
A$100,000 and 1% for income above this level. Income below A$50,001 was not subject to 
the levy. In addition, anyone who received an Australian Government Disaster Recovery 
Payment was not subject to the levy (Farmer, 2011). The flood levy and associated budget 
                                                             
10 New Zealand citizens in Australia on ‘non protected’ Special Category Visas (SCVs) (subclass 444). ‘Non 
protected’ refers to those New Zealanders who have come to Australia on SCVs since 26 February 2001. Pre-
2001 SCV holders (referred to as ‘protected’) are entitled to similar benefits as Australian permanent residents 
under social security law (Social Security Legislation Amendment (Disaster Recovery Allowance) Bill 2013).  
11 Refer Sections 30-45A and 30-46 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 which allow deductions for gifts to 
disaster relief funds. 
12 In the 2011/2012 Budget, the Australian Government announced it would introduce a statutory definition of 
charity. This definition is based on the 2001 Report of the Inquiry into the Definition of Charity and Related 
Organisations, also taking into account later judicial decisions. Legislation to progress this measure received 
royal assent in June 2013 and commenced on 1 January 2014 (ATO, 2013b). 
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cuts were expected to raise A$1.8 billion (ABC News, 2011). This expansion of the Federal 
Government’s revenue base, as an alternative to debt issuances, allowed the federal 
government to fund 50% or A$5 billion of the flood reconstruction fund (Smart, 2012). The 
levy was enacted on 22 March 2011. 
In addition to an immediate funding response, following the Queensland floods, the 
Australian Productivity Commission has been asked to assess Government funding 
arrangements for natural disasters in the longer-term (Productivity Commission, 2014).  
Rebuilding 
Tax measures to support rebuilding following the Queensland floods were in the nature of 
capital gains roll-over reliefs and tax exemptions for certain small business and primary 
producer recovery grants.  
In an Australian-first, the Lockyer Valley Regional Council unveiled a plan to relocate 
residents from the flood-devastated community of Grantham to safer ground. The deal 
between the Council and the community gave flood-devastated residents the option to move 
to higher ground as part of a voluntary land-swap initiative (Lockyer Valley Regional 
Council, 2011). While there were already existing capital gains tax (CGT) roll-over relief 
provisions for natural disasters, it was felt that these were not sufficient to cover the land 
swap arrangements proposed. As such, the Australian Government announced a number of 
additional CGT tax reliefs for taxpayers that participate in Australian government 
replacement asset programs. These included:  
 maintaining pre-CGT status for replacement assets; 
 maintaining pre-CGT status where a taxpayer builds a dwelling on replacement land;  
 separate CGT taxing point for participating taxpayers if their dwelling is destroyed as a 
result of the natural disaster; 
 CGT exemption for rights arising under assistance programmes for taxpayers affected 
by natural disasters; and 
 extending the CGT main residence exemption when a taxpayer’s main residence is 
destroyed (The Australian Treasury, 2011a). 
Initial consultation on these measures by the Australian Treasury in October 2011 (The 
Australian Treasury, 2011a) was followed up by a second consultation paper in June 2012 
(The Australian Treasury, 2012c). However, no tax legislation was forthcoming.  
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In December 2013, The Assistant Treasurer announced the outcome of consultations over the 
backlog of 92 announced but unlegislated tax and superannuation measures. Of the 64 
measures that were considered further, 16 will proceed and 48 measures will not proceed. 
Those that are not proceeding include the CGT relief for taxpayers affected by natural 
disasters. However, the announcement noted that the decision on CGT relief would not 
adversely impact the property owners in Lockyer Valley who were devastated by severe 
storms and floods and had entered into the land swap program (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2013b). 
While the federal tax changes did not occur, Queensland State tax changes to facilitate the 
land swap (such as transfer duty relief) did proceed (Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 
2011).  
The Australian Government also provided recovery assistance to small business owners and 
primary producers through the NDRAA. Under these arrangements, the Australian 
Government may reimburse 50 to 75 per cent of State or Territory expenditure on measures 
including concessional interest rate loans to small businesses, primary producers, and 
voluntary non-profit bodies. In severe events, funding for a community recovery package is 
available to help affected communities recover. The community recovery package may 
include the following assistance measures: 
 Small business recovery grants to assist with clean-up and recovery costs; and  
 Primary producer recovery grants to assist with clean-up and recovery costs 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2013a)
13
. 
Generally, amounts received by way of grants or subsidies will be assessable either as 
ordinary income or statutory income (ATO, 2013a). However, in response to the Queensland 
floods, the Australian government legislated to provide an income tax exemption for the 2500 
Clean-up and Restoration Grants to small business and primary producers, at an estimated 
cost of $A6.9 million (Tax Laws Amendment (2011 Measures No.1) Bill 2011; The 
Australian Treasury, 2011b). 
                                                             
13 In response to the Queensland floods, concessional interest rate loans of up to $250,000 were made available 
for small businesses and primary producers, as well as freight subsidies of up to $5,000 for primary producers. 
Tier 1 clean up recovery grants of up to $5,000 and Tier 2 grants of up to $20,000 were available for primary 
producers and small businesses (Commonwealth of Australia, 2013c). 
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In addition to exempting restoration grants received by primary producers, amendments were 
announced in the 2011/2012 Budget to allow farmers affected by a natural disaster to access 
their farm management deposits within 12 months of making a deposit while retaining the 
concessional tax treatment (The Australian Treasury, 2011c). 
6. Concluding policy lessons 
The final section of this paper identifies potential tax policy lessons from the Australian 
response to the Queensland floods as a useful resource for future tax policy makers, both in 
Australia and elsewhere. These initial policy lessons are based on analysis of the data to 
identify recurring themes and preliminary coding of interviews with Australian tax policy 
makers. As part of the broader study, these conclusions will be tested in coding of the 
remaining data and comparison with the tax policy changes made in response to natural 
disasters in New Zealand and Japan. 
Administrative responses – starting and stopping 
Australia’s exposure to frequent and large natural disasters has led the ATO to develop 
centralised business continuity arrangements which are integrated into all planning and 
response issues for people, buildings, systems, services, and communications. The business 
continuity arrangements operate under the Commissioner’s broad discretionary powers and 
use a standardised disaster response framework. The framework is internal guidance rather 
than a legislated set of responses, as outlined by one of the tax officials interviewed. “We 
have got this menu … that we basically work our way through”. Based on the standardised 
framework and an assessment of impacts, ATO staff recommend a response for approval by 
the Commissioner. The ability to rely on a broad discretionary power avoids the need for a 
rushed legislative response, allowing a faster response in a disaster situation. This flexibility 
is seen as useful in a natural disaster situation, as noted by one of the tax academics 
interviewed. The “Commissioner has the responsibility, and this implies powers too, for the 
general administration of the Act. That … can be interpreted very broadly. It is precisely for 
this kind of thing”.  
Having a framework of responses also recognises that different disasters have different 
impacts. The administrative framework allows the ATO to alter its responses depending on 
the scale and impact of the natural disaster, and also to ensure a consistent approach is taken. 
As such, the ATO’s administrative framework provides significant flexibility for responding 
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to natural disasters. However, there are different views on whether broad discretionary 
powers are a good idea, as evidenced by the following comments. Some policy makers think 
that it “is not the right way to run a system because everybody should know what the rules 
are, and the rules should be the same for everybody” (tax academic).  However, others 
recognise that “Life is just not like that” and “there is a lot to be said for having flexibility in 
administration” (tax academic). 
A policy alternative between the need for ex post legislative amendments and a broad 
discretionary power could be a limited discretion that only comes into effect once a state of 
emergency is declared. This would help balance concerns about generic discretionary powers 
and the benefits of speed and flexibility from an operational power. 
The other key issue in relation to administrative responses for natural disasters is when to 
cease these special arrangements and return to normal, particularly as impacts can differ 
between taxpayers, as noted by one of the tax officials interviewed. “There are a lot of 
businesses and taxpayers impacted and the impacts will go on for many years, and some 
businesses will be unviable after significant events. It is case by case support, and that is 
available any time for any person in any kind of situation”. It is important that there is clear 
communication about when special measures will come to an end and that there is sufficient 
time for taxpayers to then meet their obligations. Specific legislative responses are likely to 
have a set expiry date and may need to be rolled-over, leading to taxpayer uncertainty and 
extra administration and legislative costs. Administrative responses provided under a 
discretionary power have more flexibility, as evidenced by the ATO’s case by case approach. 
However, such flexibility does need to be applied in a consistent way. In the ATO’s case this 
is assisted by their administrative framework.  
Information sharing 
Responses to natural disasters require a coordinated cross-government response. As such, tax 
authorities are often required to work closely with other government agencies. This can be 
problematic due to standard tax secrecy laws. The Australian arrangements for information 
sharing in the event of a natural disaster offer a useful example as to how to deal with this 
issue.  
To support the cross-government operational arrangements in the event of a natural disaster, 
Australia has specific measures in place for the sharing of taxpayer information. These 
include a cross-government information sharing instrument that can be signed off by the 
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Attorney-General’s Department when a state of emergency is declared. Australia also allows 
for taxpayer-approved information sharing, which supports the provision of one-stop shops 
for government assistance as noted by one of the tax officials interviewed. “When we start 
getting to the point of recreating peoples identity and reissuing their tax file numbers, even if 
the ATO people and immigration people etc. are not in the same tent, then the guys out in the 
field have the documentation to be able to go ‘sir, would you like to sign this so that we can 
share it with other agencies as well’”. The Australian model therefore offers two forms of 
amended tax secrecy to deal with the unique circumstances of a natural disaster response. 
These provide flexibility to support cross-government cooperation in the immediate response 
phase while avoiding the need to make rushed legislative changes or alter standard tax 
secrecy provisions.  
Role of the existing policy framework and process 
While Australia’s administrative responses offer useful lessons for future policy makers, 
Australia’s legislated responses have a number of failings. By OECD standards Australia has 
a low tax and expenditure framework, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 – Size of government – OECD 2007 
 
Notes: Data for Mexico and Turkey not available. Revenue refers to receipts of tax and non-tax revenue. 
(OECD, 2008). 
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Australia's mix of direct and indirect taxes is broadly comparable to other OECD countries, 
but the composition differs, due to its dividend imputation system and lack of social security 
tax
14
. Compared with other OECD countries, Australia has a low share of tax revenue from 
labour income and broad-based consumption taxes and greater reliance on tax revenue from 
capital (with an above average company tax rate and higher percentage of taxes on property). 
The tax-transfer system is highly redistributive (The Australian Treasury, 2008). 
Australia also has a federal system of government and taxation. The fiscal relationship 
between the Australian government and the States is characterised by ‘vertical fiscal 
imbalance’, where the States’ own revenue sources are insufficient to fund their expenditure 
responsibilities. In 2006/2007, taxes levied by the States accounted for 15 per cent of total tax 
revenue, and included transaction taxes and taxes levied on narrow tax bases
15
. Thresholds, 
rates and the range of exemptions from these taxes differ between the States (The Australian 
Treasury, 2008).  
In terms of the Australian tax policy process, Heferen, Mitchell & Amalo (2013) summarised 
this into a number of distinct stages. The Treasury has primary responsibility for advising on 
tax policy development. In close conjunction with the ATO
16
, the Treasury formulates and 
provides advice to government on options, produces regulation impact statements and 
prepares official costings, which together with the overall revenue forecasts underpin 
government budgets. In doing so, Treasury officials apply both the standard tax policy 
principles and the Treasury wellbeing framework. This framework requires them to take a 
view that “encompasses more than is directly captured by commonly used measures of 
economic activity” (The Australian Treasury, 2012c). In providing tax policy advice, 
Treasury officials are required to consider the set of opportunities available to people, the 
distribution and sustainability of those opportunities, and the level and allocation of risk and 
complexity of choices borne by individuals and the community. While there are similarities 
between the wellbeing framework and various international reviews, there is no single agreed 
set of principles.  
                                                             
14 While there is no social security tax as such, Australian tax residents are required to pay a levy, calculated at a 
flat rate of 2% of a taxpayer's taxable income over a certain level, to help fund Medicare, a scheme that gives 
access to free or low cost medical care. 
15 The composition of state government revenue was: A$29 billion of specific purpose payments, A$40 billion 
GST revenue, A$36 billion other own-source revenue and A$49 billion of state taxes (The Australian Treasury, 
2008). 
16
 There are also a number of other tax governance bodies, each serving a perceived need (refer Appendix 3). 
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Tax policy in Australia is an increasingly contested policy debate, as evidenced by the 
following comments from tax officials (“there is a lot more toing and froing throughout the 
process and there is not necessarily a common understanding, or a common agreement”). It 
is “a lot more of a tussle in tax policy rather than a collaborative approach”. Tax policy 
options are generated by a multitude of sources, including electoral parties, Senate inquiries, 
academics, think tanks, lobby groups, and tax representatives. The media also plays a role, as 
indicated by one tax practitioner (“if something is released, it will hit the papers and be 
reconstructed often to the detriment of the Treasury and the ATO”). Consultation does form 
part of the tax design process, with a large number of measures subject to consultation in both 
the policy design and draft legislation phases
17
. Consultation usually involves the public 
release of an initial discussion paper, followed by an exposure draft of legislation or 
regulation. Occasionally, consultation is more targeted, either to a public audience or to a 
more confidential group. However, it was the role of political influence that was strongly 
emphasised by interview participants, including the following comment by a tax practitioner. 
“I used to think tax reform was about rational tax policy and that provided you could create a 
sufficiently rational vision and had the skill set to convince a sufficient number of people that 
it was a rational vision, that you could go forward on that basis. I don’t believe that 
anymore”. “The government will change the tax basis, notwithstanding that it breaches those 
principles, and they won’t consult with industry”. 
Once a political decision requiring legislative change is made, the Treasury is responsible for 
instructing legislative drafters in the Office of Parliamentary Counsel on tax matters, 
producing explanatory materials and regulation impact statements for tabling, conducting 
community consultation on tax policy, managing the legislation program, and assisting the 
government to secure passage of bills through the Parliament. For a tax bill to become an Act, 
it must be passed in the same form by the House of Representatives and the Senate and then 
assented to by the Governor-General. While all tax bills must originate in the House of 
Representatives, the Senate's role in tax policy is important. The Senate performs a 'house of 
review' function through its committees, with tax policy considered by the Senate Standing 
Committee on Economics.  
An outcome of both the strong political influence and lack of collaboration over tax policy 
has been lengthy delays in legislating tax changes. This is view was shared by Government 
                                                             
17 Until the early 2000s, tax policy consultation in Australia was infrequent and largely confined to 
administrative matters (Heferen et al., 2013).  
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tax officials (“It’s common knowledge that we have a legislative backlog” and “It’s not as 
planned, as evidenced by over a hundred announced but not enacted measures”) and tax 
academics. “They use the tax system for political motives and so make announcements here, 
there and everywhere, so it just backs up. What we have got is legislation by announcement”. 
These delays have resulted in reliance on administrative practice. For each tax announcement, 
the ATO decides whether it is prepared to allow taxpayers to file on the basis of announced 
tax changes. Where the discretion applies, taxpayers who have chosen to follow the 
announcement and then need to amend their tax returns are not subject to a penalty.  
The final phase of the policy process is post-implementation. As part of the regulation impact 
analysis, departments are required to provide information on how the preferred regulatory 
option will be implemented, monitored and reviewed. Formal post-implementation reviews 
are required for all regulation that initially proceeded without a compliant regulation impact 
statement. In addition, specific post-implementation reviews on tax policy are conducted by 
the Board of Taxation. Australia also has a rich history of tax policy reviews
18
.  
The Henry Review raised a number of areas for reform with respect to the Australian tax 
system. They concluded that Australia had too many taxes and too many complicated ways of 
delivering multiple policy objectives through the tax and transfer system. There are at least 
125 taxes paid by Australians every year
19
. Many taxes are levied on essentially similar 
transactions by different Australian governments with little consistency across jurisdictions 
(The Australian Treasury, 2008). The resulting complexity exceeds the capacity of legislative 
systems, operating platforms and taxpayers, meaning the tax and transfer architecture is 
beginning to fail in dealing efficiently and effectively with multiple policy goals and 
demands.  
Similar concerns have been made by other commentators and by the tax policy makers 
interviewed for this project (“There is naturally a bit of work to do, particularly around 
opportunities to increase efficiency” (tax official). “Everyone knows our income tax system 
has got all these anomalies which are costing money” (tax academic). “In one sense it is sort 
of a patchwork approach” – tax practitioner). The Australian Treasury (2008) commented 
that “levels of complexity and operating costs are likely to be above the level that is optimal 
                                                             
18 Significant reviews prior to the Henry Review include the 1975 Taxation Review Committee full report (the 
Asprey review) and the 1999 Ralph Review. 
19 Of these, 99 are levied by the Australian government, 25 by the States and 1 by local government (The 
Australian Treasury, 2008). 
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for society as a whole”. A survey by Per Capita which explored the public's attitude towards 
taxation and government expenditure revealed that Australians find the tax system 
‘burdensome’ (Heferen et al., 2013). This finding is consistent with the fact that over 70 per 
cent of Australian tax lodgers rely on tax agents to complete their personal tax returns, 
resulting in Australia having the 3rd highest rate of personal tax returns filed by tax agents in 
the OECD (Heferen et al., 2013).  
The Henry Review also recommended changes with respect to Australian tax policy-making 
and administration processes. They noted that these should be as responsive as possible for 
problems experienced by taxpayers, which required Australia to move to a more transparent 
and understandable system. It also required more effective mechanisms to respond to both 
policy and administrative issues as they arise. Smith  (2009) also commented on the lack of 
transparency in the Australian tax policy process. He noted that while tax reform sometimes 
involved proposals developed by expert bodies using open consultative processes, at other 
times the executive has used its bureaucratic advisers to develop behind‐doors, in‐house 
reform packages, akin to the semi‐secretive budget formulation process. 
These features of the Australian tax policy framework and process can be seen in Australia’s 
legislated responses to natural disasters. Prior events have meant the Australian tax 
legislation has been adapted to deal with the tax issues which arise in respect of natural 
disasters. Perhaps in recognition of Australia’s annual disaster season from late November to 
early March, there are a number of generalised natural disaster measures. However, these 
rules have developed on an ad hoc basis in response to numerous previous natural disasters 
rather than as a result of any systematic policy process. This view was reflected in comments 
by tax academics (“We have floods, we have bush fires, and they are an annual event”), tax 
practitioners (“I think that maybe in one sense we are a bit used to it” as “we get seven major 
disasters over a 10 year period in different parts of Australia. That is why we have the 
structures already in place to deal with that”) and tax officials (“There are a few small bits in 
the Capital Gains Tax Main Residence Exemption for natural disasters”). Similarly, “FBT 
actually has an exemption already built in for emergency relief assistance” (tax practitioner), 
and “…for farmers and business people, trading stock rollovers and depreciating asset 
rollovers are important. “My understanding is that those rollovers are not as generous or 
easy to access as the capital gains relief. I don’t think there is any internal consistency there” 
(tax academic). 
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This lack of consistency can be seen in the legislated responses to the Queensland floods. A 
number of tax exemptions were made in respect of various Government support payments. 
Ex-gratia Disaster Income Recovery Subsidies
20
, which are an income replacement payment 
for individuals, small businesses and farmers who have lost their main source of income as a 
direct result of a natural disaster, have generally been taxable. However, the Australian 
Government has declared that these payments are exempt income for some recent natural 
disasters. This included the Queensland floods. The Australian Government also provides 
assistance to small businesses under the NDRAA, which is generally taxable. However, the 
Australian Government declared that these emergency assistance grants were non-taxable for 
some recent natural disasters. This included the Queensland floods (ATO, 2012b).  
Australia’s reliance on State insurance taxes is also problematic, with concerns raised in a 
number of reviews about efficiency, equity and compliance and administration costs as well 
as negative impacts on the level of private insurance cover. However, this is one area, where 
following the Queensland floods, Australia may be moving closer to ‘good’ tax policy, with 
changes being made to the state taxation of private insurance.  
Finally, Australia’s highly political tax policy process, lengthy delays in legislating tax 
changes and reliance on administrative practice had an impact on the response to the 
Queensland floods. While Australia was quick to announce additional CGT tax changes to 
support the innovative Lockyer Valley land swap programme and ran a public consultation 
process in respect of the changes proposed, it was nearly three years after the floods that a 
further decision was taken to cancel these changes as part of addressing the backlog of 
announced but unlegislated tax and superannuation measures (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2013b). This legislation by press release, and subsequent back-tracking, causes considerable 
uncertainty for taxpayers who have already suffered the emotional and financial effects of a 
large scale natural disaster. 
To levy or not? 
The final policy lesson from responses to the Queensland floods is around short versus 
longer-term funding for natural disasters. While the design of the Temporary Flood and 
Cyclone Reconstruction Levy itself was broadly consistent with standard tax policy 
                                                             
20 In 2013, a decision was made allow to for payments to be made in similar circumstances but under a 
legislative scheme. This included a permanent tax change to so that the tax liability is  effectively extinguished 
(Social Security Legislation Amendment (Disaster Recovery Allowance) Bill 2013).   
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principles, the decision to impose an ex post levy rather than rely on long-term funding raises 
a number of policy questions. 
The literature identifies the pre-disaster phase as important for lessening disruption caused by 
a natural disaster, saving lives and protecting property. Governments may be able to reduce 
losses where individuals under-prepare for disasters. However, this requires governments to 
act in advance, rather than waiting until after a natural disaster has occurred. However, 
despite the risk that natural disasters pose in Australia, there is no formal natural disaster 
prefunding or insurance scheme, such as those that exist in New Zealand and Japan. Instead, 
the Australian government imposed a ‘one-off’ ex post flood levy on individual taxpayers for 
the 2011/2012 financial year to assist in funding the re-building of flood affected areas and 
infrastructure (Farmer, 2011). 
Good tax policy should ensure an adequate revenue yield. Therefore, there may be cases 
where a tax increase is required following a natural disaster, even where prefunding 
arrangements exist. However, the introduction of the levy in Australia appears more of a 
political rather that policy response. At the senate hearing for the levy, the committee heard 
evidence from a number of economists who suggested that there were several options 
available to the federal government for funding the rebuilding process. “There are at least 
three main ways to finance rebuilding. The first is to raise taxes, which further reduces 
private demand and therefore reduces economic activity even further. The second is to cut 
government spending, which also reduces economic activity even further. The third is to 
increase the fiscal deficit temporarily” (The Senate Economics Legislation Committee, 2011, 
p.15).  
The Australian government did source funds for part of the rebuilding package by deferring 
some infrastructure projects and making some budget cuts to deliver two thirds of the $5.6 
billion needed to rebuild flood affected regions. However, some commentators considered 
that further reductions could have been identified. “In my view, there certainly would have 
been scope for further reductions in government spending” (The Senate Economics 
Legislation Committee, 2011, p.15). 
Rather than an imposing a levy, the economists speaking before the senate committee 
recommended funding the remainder of the response to the natural disaster by borrowing, 
resulting in a temporary increase in the fiscal deficit. “The advantage of borrowing is that this 
does not directly reduce economic activity today, but spreads the cost of rebuilding over 
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many decades into the future. The macroeconomic goal should be to reduce the negative 
effects of the disaster soon after it occurs. Only borrowing achieves this objective” (The 
Senate Economics Legislation Committee, 2011, p.16). Another reason for increasing debt 
rather than imposing a levy is if most of the recovery spending is investment in nature then 
having the current generation pay for this is not efficient or equitable. Future beneficiaries of 
the investment should also pay, via debt and future repayment out of future taxes.  
In respect of the Queensland floods, borrowing was seen as particularly suitable given the 
relatively small amount of funding required. “…the numbers entailed here, the $5.6 billion, 
represent a very small proportion of GDP, about 0.4 per cent of one year’s GDP. Bear in 
mind that we are talking about a sum being spent not in one fiscal year but rather spread 
over two or three fiscal years. As a proportion of any one year’s GDP, the additional 
borrowing that might be entailed if the government chose to fund all of it through borrowing 
would be about 0.2 per cent of GDP” (The Senate Economics Legislation Committee, 2011, 
p.16). 
Despite these arguments, the government appeared committed to obtaining a budget surplus 
in 2012/2013, arguing that imposition of a levy was necessary given Australia would be 
undertaking an unprecedented rebuilding programme after a summer of natural disasters. 
“Rebuilding flood‐affected regions across Australia is going to be an immense national 
challenge with the Commonwealth’s costs expected to be in the vicinity of $5.6 billion. The 
levy is estimated to raise $1.8 billion towards these costs” (The Senate Economics 
Legislation Committee, 2011, p.17). 
While the unusual circumstances of a natural disaster could justify a one off tax increase, 
Australia has a history
21
 of ‘one-off’ levy payments for various reasons: 
 In response to the 1996 Port Arthur massacre, then Prime Minister John Howard 
temporarily raised the Medicare levy by 0.2 per cent to 1.7 per cent to fund his 
firearms buy-back program.   
 The Howard government also imposed a temporary levy to partially offset Australia's 
defence costs in East Timor, commencing on 1 July 2000. Individual taxpayers 
earning more than $50,000 paid the levy at a rate of 0.5 per cent and those with a 
taxable income above $100,000 paid a 1 per cent levy.  
                                                             
21 More recently, levies have been announced to fund a national disability insurance scheme (The Australian, 
2013) and temporary budget repair levy (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014). 
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 A domestic sugar levy was introduced on 1 January 2003 to fund a support package 
for sugar farmers at a time of plummeting world sugar prices, and was abolished in 
2006. A $10 levy was imposed on plane tickets in October 2001 to help pay for 
workers’ entitlements after Ansett's collapse a month earlier. It was scrapped in 2003 
(The Australian, 2013). 
These taxes are inefficient in terms of increasing the dead weight loss of the tax system and 
leading to uncertainty for taxpayers and investors. The flood levy was therefore subject to 
substantial public comment, criticism and calls for a review of funding for natural disasters.   
“In light of the many natural disasters that have occurred in a relatively short space of time 
in both Australia and the Asia-Pacific region the committee believes it would be prudent to 
examine the adequacy of its preparedness for future reconstruction efforts following a 
natural disaster, and its impact on the economy” (The Senate Economics Legislation 
Committee, 2011, p.20). 
This has led to the Australian Productivity Commission being asked to assess Government 
funding arrangements for natural disasters in the longer-term (Productivity Commission, 
2014). The outcome of this review is likely to be of considerable interest to future tax policy 
makers. 
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Appendix 1: Comparing Musgrave to recent international reviews 
 Revenue adequacy Equity Efficiency Ease of administration and 
compliance 
Consistency with fiscal 
policy 
Musgrave 
(Musgrave & 
Musgrave, 
1989). 
Good tax policy should 
ensure an adequate revenue 
yield. 
The distribution of the tax 
burden should be equitable. 
Taxes should be efficient, 
with minimal impact on 
economic decisions.  
 
The tax system should 
permit fair and non-
arbitrary administration and 
be understandable to the 
taxpayer.  
The tax system should 
facilitate the use of fiscal 
policy for stabilization and 
growth objectives.  
The Tax Review 
2001. 
 Described as fairness. 
Stressed the need to 
understand who bears the 
consequences of a tax, as 
the economic impact will 
often be different from its 
statutory impact. Identified 
a number of characteristics 
of fairness: ability to pay, 
even handedness, user pays 
and transitional fairness.  
Described as reducing 
economic distortions. Tax 
policy design should aim to 
reduce the costs of 
imposing taxes by keeping 
differences in effective tax 
rates as low as possible, 
and applying a similar tax 
treatment to closely 
substitutable activities. 
Identified reducing 
administration costs (the 
cost of the tax authority, 
courts, and executive and 
legislative processes) and 
reducing compliance costs 
(the costs of obtaining 
information and advice, 
preparing and filing returns, 
making payments, and 
resolving disputes). 
 
 
Victoria 
University of 
Wellington Tax 
Working Group 
(2010). 
Gave the principle a 
temporal dimension, taking 
a longer-term view of 
revenue adequacy. 
Introduced a temporal 
element, including how 
equity compares over 
peoples’ life-times.  
 
Advocated for efficiency in 
tax policy design. Taxes 
should be efficient and 
minimise (as far as 
possible) impediments to 
economic growth. The tax 
system should avoid 
unnecessarily distorting the 
use of resources by causing 
biases toward one form of 
activity versus another. 
The tax system should be as 
simple and low cost as 
possible for taxpayers to 
comply with and for the tax 
authority to administer. 
Emphasis on policy 
coherence and consistency 
for the tax system as a 
whole. Recognised 
lobbying costs associated 
with taxpayers seeking 
concessions.   
Review was conducted in 
the early days of the global 
financial crisis. Stressed the 
need for tax reforms to be 
affordable given fiscal 
constraints. 
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The Henry 
Review. 
Focused on the concept of 
revenue sustainability. 
The tax system should 
reflect vertical equity 
(requiring tax burdens to be 
distributed progressively) 
and horizontal equity 
(people in the same 
economic position should 
bear the same tax).  
 
Linked the principles of 
equity and efficiency. The 
tax system should raise and 
redistribute revenue at the 
least possible cost to 
economic efficiency. 
 
Encouraged simplicity. The 
tax system should be easy 
to understand and simple to 
comply with. Emphasis on 
policy coherence and 
consistency for the tax 
system as a whole. 
Considered the context in 
which the tax system 
operates: demographic 
change, changing social 
context, rising expectations 
about living standards, the 
shifting centre of world 
economic activity, 
globalisation, importance of 
national savings, and 
growing environmental 
pressures. 
The Mirrlees 
Review 
(Mirrlees, 
2011). 
Focussed on equity and did 
not identify either revenue 
adequacy or sustainability 
as a key tax policy design 
principle. 
The tax system should have 
a process and institutional 
context which is seen as 
fair. Rather than trying to 
resolve every complaint, 
policy makers should be 
transparent about the 
objectives, arguments, 
evidence and consequences 
of proposals. 
Linked the principles of 
equity and efficiency. 
Defined efficiency as 
minimising the negative 
effects of the tax system on 
welfare and economic 
efficiency. 
Advocated for a tax system 
that people understand. 
Emphasis on policy 
coherence and consistency 
for the tax system as a 
whole. 
Taxes need to be designed 
for the economies in which 
they operate. The level of 
economic development, 
types of income, growing 
inequality, and labour 
market change and 
technology need to be 
factored in when designing 
a tax system. 
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Appendix 2: Phases of the disaster management cycle 
 Firms and individuals Governments 
Pre-disaster:  
Risk 
identification 
The cost of a natural disaster can be substantially reduced if 
people are well informed and motivated towards a culture of 
prevention. This requires the collection and dissemination of 
information on hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities (United 
Nations, 2007). 
Knowledge of vulnerabilities helps governments determine how much to insure 
and spend on mitigation (IPCC, 2012; Laframboise & Loko, 2012). As the cost 
of a disaster can be reduced if people are well informed, this information should 
also be made available to individuals (The World Bank, 2010). 
Pre-disaster: 
Risk reduction 
Individuals may choose to rely on ex post assistance, as paying 
for prevention is costly while receiving relief from others is free 
(Cavallo & Noy, 2011; Cohen & Werker, 2008; Freeman et al., 
2003). Alternatively, firms and individuals could respond by 
moving to a safer location. Households and firms can also choose 
to save and accumulate reserves to cushion the welfare loss from 
disasters (Phaup & Kirschner, 2010). Finally, agents may choose 
to invest to reduce damage. From a purely economic point of 
view, investing in risk reduction pays off (Freeman et al., 2003; 
The World Bank, 2004). However, mitigation requires resources 
and involves an evaluation of the impacts and probabilities of a 
disaster occurring (Cavallo & Noy, 2011). With respect to 
evaluating risk, people differ, they do not always correctly 
perceive risk and they may not always act in their own best 
interests (The World Bank, 2010).  
Governments can take a range of risk reduction activities: legislating for risk 
reduction, allocating resources to risk management, promoting community 
participation in risk reduction, natural resource management, protecting and 
strengthening critical infrastructure, promoting public–private partnerships for 
risk reduction activities, and land-use planning (Laframboise & Loko, 2012; The 
World Bank, 2010; United Nations, 2007). However, Governments have strong 
incentives to invest in ex post assistance at the cost of ex ante prevention. 
Politicians and policy makers face weak incentives for adopting preventative 
measures (Healy & Malhotra, 2009). Diverting resources away from current 
services has a visible opportunity cost. Disasters are also considered to be “acts 
of God” and politicians are not blamed for a lack of preparation (Cavallo & Noy, 
2011). In contrast, officials are held accountable and rewarded for responding 
quickly once a disaster occurs (Phaup & Kirschner, 2010). Even if governments 
want to take action, they must finance preventative measures, trading-off 
between the cost of ex post responses as compared to pre-disaster activities 
(Cohen & Werker, 2008). 
Pre-disaster: 
Risk transfer 
Insurance plays a significant role in coping with disasters by 
transferring risk to those willing to bear it (Freeman et al., 2003; 
The World Bank, 2010). However, many private households and 
firms are inadequately or inappropriately insured (Powell et al., 
2010). This may be linked to a number of problems associated 
with insurance coverage for large natural events, for example: 
uncertainty with regard to the size of potential losses, moral 
hazard, adverse selection, highly correlated risk (Cavallo & Noy, 
2011; Kunreuther & Pauly, 2009); and uneven protection 
(Freeman et al., 2003). Due to these challenges, governments may 
choose to mandate the purchase of private insurance or offer 
insurance to property owners directly (Phaup & Kirschner, 2010). 
However, mandated insurance policies have higher administrative 
costs resulting in higher premiums (Phaup & Kirschner, 2010). 
Governments can transfer risk by taking out private insurance (Freeman et al., 
2003; Phaup & Kirschner, 2010; The World Bank, 2010). Insurance can be 
beneficial where premiums are lower than the expected loss (The World Bank, 
2010). Risk assessment to determine the amount of insurance and payment of 
premiums focuses attention on mitigation prior to a loss event. The transfer of 
funds also puts money beyond the reach of politicians and officials who might 
otherwise divert funds. Disadvantages with insurance are that it leaves the 
government with counterparty risk (Phaup & Kirschner, 2010) and contracts can 
be expensive, with prices fluctuating every time there is a major event (Cavallo 
& Noy, 2011). An alternative is a catastrophe bond. However, the market for 
such instruments is in its infancy (Cavallo & Noy, 2011). Governments may also 
self-insure by establishing a general fund or annual budget allocation to provide 
for natural disaster expenditure (Freeman et al., 2003; Laframboise & Loko, 
2012). These provide incentives to undertake mitigation activities and 
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Individuals also bare counterparty risk, although this may 
ultimately be passed back to the government. Where insurance is 
provided directly by the government, there can be challenges with 
controlling costs as there may be political pressure to lower 
premiums, opposition to risk-based pricing and capping coverage 
(Freeman et al., 2003; The World Bank, 2010). 
reassurance to potential insurers and donors (Freeman et al., 2003).  However, 
fully funding disaster costs may be expensive (Cavallo & Noy, 2011) and will 
divert resources away from other infrastructure and social spending 
(Laframboise & Loko, 2012). An alternative is to adopt a stable, sustainable 
fiscal policy, which gives governments the ability to fund responses by 
increasing international borrowing (Phaup & Kirschner, 2010). 
Immediate 
response 
The response phase begins immediately after a disaster happens 
and includes both immediate relief and responses to re-establish 
systems and infrastructure (Todd & Todd, 2011). For firms and 
households, the focus is fast effective relief – to help those 
affected to recover from the immediate effects of the disaster by 
providing food, shelter and medical care (Freeman et al., 2003, 
The World Bank, 2004; Todd & Todd, 2011; Venn, 2012). 
In determining how to respond, governments assess physical damage and the 
likely impact on economic activity (The World Bank, 2010).  An assessment of 
the effects of the disaster is needed to guide decisions on the level of relief to 
provide as support is limited by the government’s fiscal situation (The World 
Bank, 2010). Governments also need to consider how their recovery responses 
impact on private incentives to prepare for disasters, as Government relief can 
displace the efforts of others and increase the cost of government responses 
(Phaup & Kirschner, 2010). Government relief in this phase often takes the form 
of transfers in cash or in kind. Short-term measures like income support and 
wage subsidies are used to help workers who have been displaced by temporary 
firm closures and to provide support for firms to preserve jobs (Venn, 2012).  
Medium-term government responses can also include public works programmes 
to employ displaced workers and financing for firms affected by a disaster 
(Venn, 2012).  
Post-disaster This phase includes recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction 
activities (Venn, 2012), and may also include developing risk 
reduction measures to reduce future vulnerability (IPCC, 2012; 
The World Bank, 2004).  Medium term responses take the first 
steps towards recovery by assessing damage to infrastructure, 
communities, institutions, and business and planning restoration 
activities (Todd & Todd, 2011). Assessing the impact of a natural 
disaster on individuals and firms is likely to identify a reduction 
in productive capacity caused by damage to business assets and 
infrastructure, and damage to agriculture (The World Bank, 2004) 
and natural resources (Freeman et al., 2003). There is also likely 
to be change in demand (negative for those with reduced clients 
and positive for those involved in construction or outside the 
affected areas), banking losses, increased insurance premiums, 
reduced employment and decreased housing market activity, 
followed by property and rental increases where the loss of 
dwellings outstrips the loss of population (Parker & Steenkamp, 
2012). These impacts on individuals and firms raise a number of 
issues for governments. 
Private effects of a natural disaster translate into large long-lasting macro-
economic impacts (Freeman et al., 2003). Disasters impact the level of GDP, 
leading to a worsening fiscal position as the tax base contracts and spending 
needs rise (Freeman et al., 2003). They result in a weakening trade balance as the 
capacity to produce exports falls and reconstruction needs increase imports and 
divert domestic products to the home market (Laframboise & Loko, 2012). This 
(and foreign investors’ concerns about future earnings and tax pressures) puts 
downward pressure on the exchange rate (Freeman et al., 2003). Inflationary 
pressures arise from an excess of monetary holdings in the face of reduced 
incomes and wealth, monetization and exchange rate depreciation (Freeman et 
al., 2003). Natural disasters can also have a negative impact on the fiscal 
accounts and levels of public debt. Typically, tax revenues decrease as economic 
activity declines and emergency relief and reconstruction lead to an increase in 
government expenditures (Melecky & Raddatz, 2011). If governments borrow to 
fund the deficit, public debt ratios rise. A fall in domestic savings is also likely, 
leading to an increase in borrowing abroad. While these economic impacts are 
relatively well understood, quantifying the economic impact can be difficult as it 
is hard to disentangle the effects of the disaster, and timely and reliable data can 
be hard to obtain or interpret (Parker & Steenkamp, 2012).  
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Appendix 3: Other Australian Tax Governance Bodies 
 
Name Entity type Role 
Board of Taxation  Non-statutory 
advisory body  
The Board advises the Treasurer on improving the general 
integrity and function of the taxation system. It provides business 
and broader community perspectives. Established in 2000.  
Inspector General 
of Taxation  
Independent 
statutory agency  
Identifies systemic issues in tax administration and reports to the 
Government with recommendations for improving tax 
administration. Does not review tax policy. Established in 2003.  
Taxation 
Ombudsman  
Independent 
statutory agency  
Investigates complaints from taxpayers and tax professionals 
about the administrative actions of the Australian Taxation Office 
(ATO). Also uses information from complaints to identify 
potential systemic problems in tax administration. Established in 
1995.  
Australian 
National Audit 
Office  
Independent 
statutory agency  
Undertakes financial statement audits and performance audits 
examining the economy, efficiency and administrative 
effectiveness of the ATO’s administration of the tax system.  
Tax Practitioners 
Board  
Independent 
statutory board  
The Board is responsible for the registration and regulation of tax 
practitioners and for ensuring compliance with the Tax Agent 
Services Act 2009. Replaces six state based Tax Agents’ Boards.  
Tax and Transfer 
Policy Institute  
Independent 
research centre  
The institute was established in 2013 as an independent centre for 
excellence at the Australian National University Crawford School 
of Public Policy.  
Parliamentary 
Budget Office  
Parliamentary 
department  
Informs the Parliament by providing independent and non-
partisan analysis of the budget cycle, fiscal policy and the 
financial implications of proposals. Established in 2011.  
Joint Committee 
of Public 
Accounts and 
Audit (JCPAA)  
Statutory 
Committee in 
Parliament  
Since 2007, JCPAA has conducted public hearings with the ATO 
Commissioner with respect to the administration of the tax 
system.  
Senate Economics 
Committee  
Statutory 
Committee in 
Parliament  
Investigate specific matters of policy, government administration 
or performance.  
(Heferen et al., 2013, p.12). 
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